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The U.S. "Innocent Construction" Rule and 
English Mitior Sensus Doctrine Reexamined 
by Kyu Ho Youm, Ph.D.* 
Words are ambiguous. One cannot say with certainty whether or not a word 
is defamatory,l unless and until the word has been placed in context as to time, 
place, and association so that its meaning can be determined. When ambiguity 
of meaning comes into play, the determination of libelous or slanderous 
expression2 may become even more difficult. Courts generally say that unless 
the language precipitating the libel action is not reasonably capable of a defa-
matory meaning, the case must be submitted to the jury.3 By contrast, the so-
called "innocent construction" rule denies the jury such a role. 
Under the rule of innocent construction in use in Illinois4 and several other 
states,S judges make the initial determination on the question of whether an 
allegedly defamatory publication is susceptible of an innocent construction. This 
common law libel rule, as originally enunciated by the Illinois Supreme Court 
in a 1962 case, john v. Tribune CO.,6 and as modified twenty years later in Chapski 
• Assistant Professor of Journalism, Speech Communication Department, Loras College. My thanks 
to Dr. Harry W. Stonecipher, Meeman Distinguished Visiting Professor at University of Tennessee 
School of Journalism for his guidance in the preparation of this article. 
1 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS defines a communication as "defamatory" when it "tends 
to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter 
third persons from association or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]' In a similar vein, one legal authority defines "defamatory" language as 
"that which tends to injure 'reputation' in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, good 
will or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings 
or opinions against him." PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § III, at 773 (W. Keeton ed. 5th 
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS]. 
2 The terms "libelous" or "slanderous" and "defamatory" are used interchangeably in this Article. 
'See, e.g., Thomson v. Cash, 402 A.2d 651 (N.H. 1979); Denny v. Mertz, 84 Wis. 2d 654, 267 
N.W.2d 304 (1978); Rovira v. Boget, 240 N.Y. 314, 148 N.E. 534 (1925); Holmes v. Clisby, 118 Ga. 
820, 45 S.E. 684 (1903). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states thus: "The jury determines 
whether a communication, capable of a defamatory meaning, was so understood by its recipient." 
RESTATEMENT, supra note I, § 614. 
4 For a discussion of the innocent construction rule as applied by Illinois, see infra text accompanying 
notes 91-95,112-30, 147-64, 174-84, 189-202,204-52. 
5 For a discussion of the innocent construction rule as applied by California, Montana, Nebraska, 
and Ohio, among the states other than Illinois, see infra text accompanying notes 96-99, 131-46, 165-
66. 
6 John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437,181 N.E.2d 105 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962). 
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v. Copley Press,? requires that judges, as opposed to juries, give allegedly defa-
matory words an innocent construction and declare them nonactionable if such 
an interpretation is "reasonable."8 
The innocent construction rule is generally understood to derive from the 
English doctrine of mitior sensus (literally, "milder or more lenient sense"). Laur-
ence Eldredge, for example, characterized the U.S. rule as "a resurrection, in 
large part, of the rule of mitior sensus."9 Similarly, several commentators explain 
the history of the innocent construction rule in connection with its conceptual 
similarity to the mitior sensus doctrine.1O Illinois courts, which use the innocent 
construction rule more frequently and more extensively than any other juris-
dictions adopting the rule, also trace the origin of the rule to the mitior sensus 
doctrine. For example, in Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc.,ll the Illinois Appellate 
Court stated: 
The [innocent construction] rule has a long history. Originally 
adopted in England as the doctrine of mitior sensus, the rule is that 
when the words which form the heart of a defamation suit can be 
given two or more meanings, one of which is favorable and not 
defamatory, the court will construe the words in the favorable 
sense. I ' 
Similarly, in 1982 the Illinois Supreme Court in Chapski v. Copley Press, citing 
libel authority Laurence Eldredge, termed the concept of innocent construction 
"a resurrection of the long-discarded 16th- and 17th-century rule of mitior 
sensus."I3 
While the development of the innocent construction rule in the United States 
is well documented, analysis of the innocent construction rule's evolution from 
7 Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 III. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982). 
8Id. at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199. 
9 L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 24, at 161 (1978) [hereinafter ELDREDGE]. See also PROSSER 
& KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 1 § 111, at 780-81; Malone & Smolla, The Future of Defamation in 
Illinois After Colson v. Stieg and Chapski v. Copley Press, Inc., 32 DE PAUL L. REv. 219, 287 (1983); Polelle, 
The Guilt of the "Innocent Construction Rule" in Illinois Defamation Law, 1 N. ILL. L. REV. 181, 188-93 
(1981) [hereinafter Polelle]. 
IO ClIs.: Comment, Chapski v. Copley Press: Modification of the Illinois Innocent Construction Rule, 17 J. 
MAR. L. REV. 233, 235 n.20 (1984) [hereinafter Modification of the Rule]; Case Comment, The Reform of 
the Innocent Construction Rule in Illinois: Chapski v. Copley Press, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 263,264-66 (1984) 
[hereinafter Reform of the Rule]; Note, The Illinois Doctrine of Innocent Construction: A Mincmty of One, 30 
U. CHI. L. REV. 524, 526 n.9, 539 (1963) [hereinafter Illinois Doctrine]. 
II Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 III. App. 3d 67, 397 N .E.2d 41 (1979). 
I21d. at 71, 397 N.E.3d at 44 (citing The Lord Cromwell's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 12b, 76 Eng. Rep. 877 
(1578-81). 
13 Chapski, 92 III. 2d at 349, 443 N.E. at 197 (citing ELDREDGE, supra note 9, at 161). The Illinois 
Supreme Court in Chapski also examined the English mitior sensus doctrine as the predecessor of the 
innocent construction rule from the perspective of its similarity to the U.S. rule. See Chapski, 92 III. 2d 
at 349-51, 442 N.E. 2d at 197-98. For a discussion of the Chapski case, see infra text accompanying 
notes 204-17. 
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the English mitior sensus doctrine is surprisingly scanty. Nearly all U.S. commen-
tators on the rule have treated its historical connection with the English common 
law doctrine in a cursory or superficial way. More often than not, only one or 
two English cases applying the mitior sensus doctrine are discussed in the course 
of examining the rule of innocent construction.[4 Likewise, U.S. courts have 
given only brief consideration to the English doctrine.[S In Illinois, the courts 
have mentioned no more than two English defamation cases in which the mitior 
sensus doctrine was invoked or noted as a rule.[6 These courts often rely on 
secondary sources for a clarification of the relationship between the U.S. rule 
and the English doctrine.[7 Some legal scholars and commentators have ex-
plained the origin of the innocent construction rule primarily by focusing on 
how the mitior sensus doctrine was rejected by American courts.[8 But they have 
failed to explore the similarities or differences, if any, between these two common 
law libel rules, one Briti~h, the other American. [9 Given the fact that the inno-
cent construction rule has been a frequent subject of legal studies since it was 
adopted by U.S. courts in 1962,20 it is surprising that there has been no thor-
ough, detailed analysis of the British genesis of this U.S. libel defense. One 
commentator has noted: "Although the rule [of innocent construction] has been 
much talked about, it has been little analyzed (more out of ignorance than 
disinterest, it appears)."2[ 
This Article reexamines the innocent construction rule within the historical 
context of the English mitior sensus doctrine, focusing on two major questions. 
First, does the concept of innocent construction as understood and used by U.S. 
courts and jurists parallel the English mitior sensus doctrine? Second, if the 
concept of innocent construction does parallel the mitior sensus doctrine, in what 
way and to what extent are they similar; if the concept and the doctrine are not 
parallel, what distinguishes the two? 
14 See Illinois Doctrine, supra note 10, at 526 n.9 (discussed a 1607 English slander case, Holt v. Astrigg, 
in the course of illustrating how the mitior sensus doctrine was tortiously utilized for the defendant); 
Reform of the Rule, supra note 10, at 265 n.21 (noted the Holt case as an "extreme example of the mitior 
sensus doctrine"); Symposium: Libel and Slander in Illinois, 43 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1,3 n.9 (1957) (termed 
Holt the "most ridiculous example" of the mitior sensus doctrine) [hereinafter Libel and Slander]. 
[5 For a discussion of the U.S. courts' rejection of the mitior sensus doctrine, see infra text accom-
panying notes 89-90. 
16 See Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 350, 442 N.E.2d 195, 198 (1982); Dauw v. Field 
Enterprises, Inc., 78 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71, 397 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1979). 
17 See Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 349-50, 442 N.E.2d at 197-98 (cited in ELDREDGE, supra note 9); W. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § III, at 747 (4th ed. 1971); Holdsworth, Defamation in 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 40 L.Q. REV. 302, 405-08 (1924) [hereinafter Holdsworth]; 
Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation fry the Common Law, 15 VAN. L. REV. 1051, 1064-65 (1962) 
[hereinafter Lovell]; Dauw, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 71, 397 N .E.2d at 44. 
18 See Polelle, supra note 9, at 199-93; Reform of the Rule, supra note 10, at 264-66. 
19 See id. 
20 See generally supra notes 9-10, 14 and infra note 210. 
21 Libel and Slander, supra note 14, at II. 
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This Article will focus on the legal rationale of the innocent construction rule 
and the mitior sensus doctrine as common law libel rules, the parameters of their 
application in libel litigation, and their strengths and weaknesses as libel rules. 
In Part I, the author analyzes the English mitior sensus doctrine from the 
perspective of its judicial application to a number of defamation cases reported 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. First, the author discusses the 
history of the doctrine, primarily focusing on the socio-legal circumstances in 
England that contributed to the adoption of the mitior sensus doctrine in the 
mid-1500s as a defamation rule. Second, the author examines the gradual 
demise or modification of the doctrine in eighteenth-century England. In the 
course of analyzing how the English courts eventually rejected the doctrine, the 
merits as well as the demerits of the English doctrine are examined in the 
context of the doctrine's application in defamation litigation. 
Part II is devoted to an in-depth discussion of the innocent construction rule, 
beginning with the U.S. courts' rejection of the English mitior sensus doctrine. 
The author discusses the scope of the application of the rule as a libel defense 
in various jurisdictions, including Illinois. Modification of the rule in 1982 
illustrates how the common law libel defense has survived various challenges 
both from within and without the courts. In addition, the author assesses the 
impact of the modified innocent construction rule upon Illinois libel law by 
analyzing the courts' recent utilization of the rule in defamation actions. The 
strengths and weaknesses of the rule as a libel defense in Illinois and other 
jurisdictions are also examined. 
In conclusion, the similarities and differences between the English mitior sensus 
doctrine and the U.S. innocent construction rule are set out in terms of their 
judicial raison d'etre and their application as libel defenses. 
1. THE ENGLISH MITIOR SENSUS DOCTRINE 
The mitior sensus doctrine required that allegedly defamatory words "be con-
strued, not in their natural sense, but, whenever possible, in 'mitiori sensu'. That is, 
they must be held not to be defamatory if a non-defamatory sense could be 
twisted out of them."22 As Laurence Eldredge noted, this doctrine was devised 
by the English common law courts to restrain the sudden proliferation of 
defamation suits in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.23 
22 Holdsworth, supra note 17, at 406-07 (emphasis added). See also 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW 355 (2d. 1937). 
23 Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REV. 733, 752 (1966). See also Hold-
sworth, supra note 17, at 404. On the drastic increase in the number of defamation cases reported 
under Elizabeth I (1558-1603), James I (1603-25\, and Charles I (1625-49) as compared with earlier 
periods, Richard O'Sullivan observed: "[T]here had been no more than ten [defamation actions] in all 
the Year Books (1297-1537) down to 1535. Rolle's abridgment (tern. Eliz.) reports no less than 350 
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The first English defamation action in which the mitior sensus doctrine appears, 
as dictum, was The Lord Cromwell's Case24 decided by the King's Bench in the 
period of 1578 to 1581. Even though the court did not directly apply the mitior 
sensus doctrine in ruling against the plaintiff, the court noted it with approval. 25 
Lord Cromwell had brought the action against Edward Denny for the latter's 
statement: "You like not of me since you like those that maintain sedition against 
the Queen's proceedings."26 The court decided the action for the defendant 
upon the ground of truth and the occasion of speaking the words. The defense 
of truth was presented by proving that the plaintiff procured two persons to 
preach in the Church of Northlinham, who in their sermons inveighed against 
the Book of Common Prayer, and affirmed it to be superstitious and impious.27 
The occasion of the statement showed that the defendant's allegedly defamatory 
remark was precipitated by the plaintiff's insult to him.28 On the other hand, 
the plaintiff claimed that the defendant's justification for the statement regard-
ing "sedition" was not a sufficient defense since sedition cannot be committed 
by words, but by public and violent action.29 The defendant responded that the 
word "sedition" as used by him did not mean public or violent sedition as the 
plaintiff described.3D The English court explained its approach in judging the 
defamatory nature of a statement before upholding the defendant's interpre-
tation of the word "sedition": 
[I]f a man brings an action on the case for calling the plaintiff 
murderer; the defendant will say, that he was talking with the plain-
tiff concerning unlawful hunting, and the plaintiff confessed that 
he killed several hares with certain engines; to which the defendant 
answered and said, "Thou art a murderer," (innuendo the killing 
of the said hares) this is no justification, for he does not justify the 
sense of the words which the declaration imports, and therefore he 
ought to plead not guilty; but as to that it was answered by the 
defendant's counsel, and resolved by the whole Court, that the 
justification was good. For in case of slander by words, the sense of 
them appears by the cause and occasion of speaking of them.31 
cases of slander. In Croke Jacobus there are 121; in Croke Carolus there are 81; in Style there are 
(tem. Commonwealth) 120." O'Sullivan, The Evolution of the Law of Libel, 3 C.L.P. 84,87 (1950). See 
also M. NEWELL, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION: LIBEL AND SLANDER 20 (1890); J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, 368 (2d ed. 1979). 
24 Lord Cromwell's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 12b, 76 Eng. Rep. 877 (1578-81). 
25 See infra note 31. 
26 Lord Cromwell's Case, at 12b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 877. 
27 [d. at 13a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 881. 
28 The plaintiff said to the defendant, "Thou are a false varlet, and I like not of thee." [d. at 13b, 
76 Eng. Rep. at 881. 
29 [d. at 13b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 881. 
30 !d. at 14a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 883. 
31 !d. at 13b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 882. 
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In this case, the mitior sensus doctrine was noted as one approach toward the 
problem of choosing one of the two or more meanings implied by a statement. 32 
A 1585 case, Stanhope v. Blith,33 is the first reported defamation action in 
England in which the doctrine of mitior sensus was applied as a rule of law.34 
Writing for the court in Stanhope, Chief Justice Wray clarified the purpose of 
the doctrine: to check the flow of slander actions. He said: "[A]ctions for scandals 
should not be maintained by any strained construction or argument, nor any 
favour given to support them, forasmuch as in these days they more abound 
than in times past, and the intemperance and malice of men increase."35 In the 
same year Stanhope was decided, the mitior sensus doctrine was successfully in-
voked in Hext v. Yeomans,36 finding the expression "B seeks my life" to be 
nonactionable.37 The Hext court held the words were not defamatory because 
first, "he may seek his life lawfully upon just cause," and secondly, "seeking of 
his life is too general and for seeking tantum no punishment is inflicted by the 
law."38 
Under the mitior sensus doctrine, imputing a mere intention to commit a crime 
was held to be nonactionable. The court in Eaton v. Allen,39 for example, ob-
served: "[T]he mere intent without an act is not punishable."40 The court held 
nondefamatory the statement, "He is a brabler [sic], and a quarreller, for he 
gave his champion counsel to make a deed of gift of his goods, to kill me, and 
then to fly out of the country, but God preserved me."41 Similarly, it was held 
non actionable to accuse a man of an impossible crime.42 
As one U.S. legal scholar has noted,43 middle-class people in sixteenth-century 
England were dissatisfied with ecclesiastical reliefs for defamation; the English 
church courts generally disapproved private Iibel.44 Instead, these people turned 
32 In a declaration not directly relevant to the decision, the Cromwell court stated:" quod sensus verborum 
est duplex, scil. mitis et asper; et verba semper accipienda sunt in mitiori sensu" [when the meaning is ambiguous, 
both mild and harsh is evident, then the milder meaning must be taken]. Id. at I3a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 
880-81. 
33 Stanhope v. Blith, 4 Co. Rep. 15a, 76 Eng. Rep. 891 (1585). 
34 See Lovell, supra note 17, at 1064. 
35 Stanhope, 4 Co. Rep. at 15b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 892. 
36 Hext v. Yeomans, 4 Co. Rep. 15b, 76 Eng. Rep. 893 (1585). 
37 Id. at 15b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 893. 
38/d. at 15b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 893. 
39 Eaton, V. Allen, 4 Co. Rep. 16b, 76 Eng. Rep. 16b, 76 Eng. Rep. 896 (1598). 
40 /d. at 16b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 896. 
41/d. at 16b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 896. 
42 See Jackson v. Adams, 2 Bing. N.C. 402, 132 Eng. Rep. 158 (1835). InJackson, the court held that 
to say a churchwarden stole the bell-ropes of his own parish was not actionable because the property 
of the bell-ropes of a parish church is in the possession of the churchwardens of the parish. 
4' Lovell, supra note 17, at 1064. 
44 The church courts disapproved private defamation suits on the basis of the teachings of the books 
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to the common law courts which more frequently ruled for defendants in libel 
litigation. As a result, the common law courts in late sixteenth-century England 
were inundated with defamation actions. In the face of the sudden increase in 
defamation suits, the English courts resorted to the mitior sensus doctrine as an 
effective judicial weapon to dismiss the suits on the ground that the allegedly 
defamatory statement, imputing ecclesiastical sins, would not constitute common 
law slander in reference to temporal damage. It was held, therefore, in a 1669 
slander case, Barnes v. Bruddel,45 that to say of a virgin of good fame, "She was 
with child by Simons," whereby she lost her parents' favor, was nonactionable.46 
The decision in Barnes was no doubt due in part to the rule that defamation, 
which alleged offenses cognizable only in the church courts, was not actionable 
at common law.47 
As with the U.S. innocent construction rule,4B the early English courts, in 
applying the mitior sensus doctrine, flatly rejected "innuendo" in interpreting the 
defamatory meaning of words.49 In a 1599 case,James v. Rutlech,50 for example, 
the plaintiff attempted to prove the defamatory character of the statement, "He 
is full of the pox," by using the innuendo that "the pox is the French pox." The 
James court held that the innuendo could not be used in such a way as to extend 
the general words at issue,51 stating that the words should be taken in mitiori 
sensu. The court further observed, "The office of an innuendo is to designate 
a person who has been named in certain, and in effect it stands in place of 
praedictus [aforesaid]; but it cannot make a person certain who was before 
uncertain."52 Three years later, the court in Barham v. Nethersal53 again rejected 
innuendo in construing the phrase, "to burn my barn," to mean "a barn with 
corn."54 The court held that the words were not actionable, for it was not 
of Exodus and Leviticus in the Old Testament. T. TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 17 n.45 (1985). 
45 Barnes v. Bruddel, 1 Lev. 261,83 Eng. Rep. 397 (1669). 
46 [d. at 261,83 Eng. Rep. at 397. 
47 See also Yates v. Lodge, 3 Lev. 18, 83 Eng. Rep. 555 (1681). 
48 See, e.g., Springer v. Harwig, 94 111. App. 3d 281, 481 N.E.2d 870 (1981); Van Tuil v. Carroll, 3 
Ill. App. 3d 869, 279 N.E.2d 361 (1972); Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 Ill. 2d 345, 243 
N.E.2d 217 (1968). 
49 One law dictionary defines "innuendo" as follows: 
An "innuendo" in pleading in libel action is a statement by plaintiff of construction which 
he put upon words which are alleged to be libelous and which meaning he will induce jury 
to adopt at trial. Its function is to set a meaning upon words or language of doubtful or 
ambiguous import which alone would not be actionable. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (5th ed. 1979). 
50 James v. Rutlech, 4 Co. Rep. 17a, 76 Eng. Rep. 900 (1599). 
51 [d. at 17b, 76 Eng. Rep. at 902. 
5' [d. at 17a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 901. 
53 Barham v. Nethersal, 4 Co. Rep. 20a, 76 Eng. Rep. 918 (1602). 
54 [d. at 20a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 908. 
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felonious to burn a barn if it is not a part of a mansion-house, nor full of corn, 
and "the innuendo will not serve when the words themselves are not slander-
OUS."55 
In Selby v. Carrier, 56 the application of the mitior sensus doctrine was extended 
to the interpretation of a statement in which an allegedly defamatory word was 
used as an adjective. "Thou art a bankruptly knave," according to the Selby 
court, was defamatoryY The court went on to hold, however, that "a bankrupt 
knave" was not actionable because the words did not mean that he was bankrupt, 
but only that he was like a bankrupt knave.58 
A search of the reported cases indicates that the first time the mitior sensus 
doctrine was unsuccessfully applied by the defendant since its inception some 
30 years earlier, was in a 1607 case, Dame Morison v. Cade. 59 In Morison, the 
court refused to apply the doctrine to interpret the words: "I have had the use 
of her [Dame Morison's] body." The defendant asserted that the words may 
have an innocent meaning, that is, a physician may have the use of the plaintiff's 
body.60 The court disagreed, ruling: "[T]he words in themselves cannot have 
any reasonable construction, and they shall be taken according to the usual and 
common sense of them, which is very slanderous to a lady of such reputation."61 
The Morison case was significant because the court's interpretation altered the 
application of the mitior sensus doctrine by emphasizing the "usual and common 
sense" of the words used. 
Even though Morison somewhat modified mitior sensus, the doctrine's use and 
vitality was largely maintained in later defamation cases. In 1608, one year after 
Morison, for example, the court in Robins v. Hildredon62 held it nonactionable to 
say, "Thou art a thievish knave and hath stolen my wood."63 The court, noting 
that the word "thief" was used in its adjectival form, observed that unless the 
plaintiff was called a thief generally, the word was not defamatory because it 
was used as an adjective to qualify "knave," not as a noun.64 The Robins court 
added that the defendant's statement charging the plaintiff with stealing his 
wood was not actionable on the ground that it was not shown that the wood 
was lumber.65 The Robins court further noted that the wood might have been 
55 !d. at 20a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 908-09. 
56 Selby v. Carrier, Cro. Jac. 345, 79 Eng. Rep. 295 (1615). 
57 Id. at 345, 79 Eng. Rep. at 295. 
58 Id. at 345. 79 Eng. Rep. at 295. See also Booth v. Seeie, I Sid. 104, 82 Eng. Rep. 997 (1663). 
59 Dame Morison v. Cade, Cro. Jac. 162,79 Eng. Rep. 142 (1607). 
60Id. at 163, 79 Eng. Rep. at 142. 
61Id. at 163, 79 Eng. Rep. at 142. 
6' Robins v. Hildredon, Cro. Jac. 65, 79 Eng. Rep. 55 (1608). 
63Id. at 65, 75 Eng. Rep. at 55. 
64 Id. at 66, 79 Eng. Rep. at 56. 
65Id. at 66, 79 Eng. Rep. at 56. 
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intended for "growing," which was not felonious and therefore not actionable.66 
In a similar way, it was held nondefamatory to charge a man with having stolen 
iron bars from windows, as the court in Powell v. Hutchins67 stated, because the 
bars were part of the freehold. 68 
The extreme to which the mitior sensus doctrine was extended is illustrated by 
a 1608 case, Holt v. Astrigg.69 In Holt, the plaintiff [Sir Thomas Holt] brought 
action for the defendant's statement, "Sir Thomas Holt struck his cook on the 
head with a cleaver, and cleaved his head; the one part lay on the one shoulder, 
and another part on the other."70 The words were referring to an act of hom-
icide alleged to be committed by Sir Holt. Holt is a case often cited as an example 
which typifies the strained application of the mitior sensus doctrine. 71 The court, 
however, found for the defendant in this case and held that "[S]lander ought 
to be direct, against which there may not be any intendment: but ... notwith-
standing such wounding, the party may yet be living; and it is then but tres-
pass."72 
Although the mitior sensus doctrine was still being applied as late as 1835,73 
the doctrine had ceased to be an effective judicial weapon in defamation cases 
by the early 1800s.74 As noted earlier, the Morison case strongly implied a 
modification of the mitior sensus doctrine by explicitly stating that the words 
alleged to be libelous should be taken according to their "usual and common 
sense."75 This modification was reaffirmed in a 1694 case, Somers v. House,'6 
where the court found the statement, "You are a rogue, and broke open a 
house at Oxford," actionable, reasoning that: 
[F]or upon all the words together, a man who heard them could not 
intend other than a felonious breaking of the house. And tho' in 
the old books the rule was, to take the words in mitiori sensu; 
Yet by Holt C.J. they would give not favour to words, and should 
give satisfaction to them whose reputation is hurt; and would take 
66 Id. at 66, 79 Eng. Rep. at 56. 
67 Powell v. Hutchins, Cro. Jac. 205, 79 Eng. Rep. 179 (1609). 
68Id. at 205, 79 Eng. Rep. at 179. 
69 Holt v. Astrigg, Cro. Jac. 185, 79 Eng. Rep. 161 (1608). 
70Id. at 185, 79 Eng. Rep. at 161. 
71 See Illinois Doctrine, supra note 10, at 526 n.9; Reform of the Rule, supra note 10, at 265 n.21; Libel 
and Slander, supra note 14, at 2 n.9. 
72 Holt, Cro. Jac. at 185, 79 Eng. Rep. at 161. See also Snag v. Gee, 4 Co. Rep. 16a, 76 Eng. Rep. 
896 (1507). 
"See, e.g., Jackson v. Adams, 2 Bing N.C. 402, 132 Eng. Rep. 158 (1835). 
74 See, e.g., Roberts v. Camden, 9 East 93, 103 Eng. Rep. 508 (1807); Eldredge, supra note 23, at 
735. 
75 For a discussion of Morison, see supra text accompanying notes 58-60. 
76 Somers v. House, Holt, K.B. 39,90 Eng. Rep. 919 (1694). 
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words in a common sense according to vulgar intendment of the 
by-standers. 77 
The Somers court further delineated the boundary for the application of the 
English doctrine to situations "where the words in their natural import are 
doubtful, and equally to be understood in the one sense as in the other."78 
In 1714, the court in Harrison v. Thornborough79 again rejected the defense of 
mitior sensus in a slander action. The Harrison court ruled against the defendant 
on the ground that the phrase, "gone off," in the sense of the plaintiff's business 
going bankrupt, was a defamatory statement.80 The Harrison court, explaining 
first why the mitior sensus doctrine came to be adopted as a libel rule in England 
and then how the doctrine lost its favor with the English courts, observed that: 
The words which an [sic] hundred years ago did not import a 
slanderous sense now may; and so vice versa. In this kind of action 
for words, which are not of very great antiquity, the Courts did at 
first, as much as they could, discountenance them; and that for a 
wise reason, because generally brought for contention and vexation; 
and therefore when the words were capable of two constructions, 
the Court always took them mitiori sensu. But latterly these actions 
have been more discountenanced; for men's tongues growing more 
virulent, and irreparable damage arising from words, it has been 
by experience found, that unless men can get satisfaction by law, 
they will be apt to take it themselves. The rule therefore that has now 
prevailed is, that words are to be taken in that sense that is most natural 
and obvious, and in which those to whom they are spoken will be sure to 
understand them. 81 
The Harrison opinion clearly indicates that the mitior sensus doctrine was losing 
its strength as a rule in defamation litigation in England and was being replaced 
by the "most natural and obvious sense" rule.82 
There are several additional reasons for the demise of the English doctrine 
which illustrate the inherent problems of the rule. First, the rule could not 
provide an adequate remedy in defamation actions because it was originally 
77 /d. at 39, 90 Eng. Rep. at 919. 
78Id. at 39, 90 Eng. Rep. at 919. 
79 Harrison v. Thornborough, 10 Mod. Rep. 196,88 Eng. Rep. 691 (1714). 
80/d. at 197, 88 Eng. Rep. at 691. The statement at issue in the Harrison case was: "Two dyers are 
gone off (innuendo become bankrupt), and for aught I know Harrison will be so too .... " /d. at 196, 
88 Eng. Rep. at 691. 
81/d. at 197-98,88 Eng. Rep. at 691-92 (emphasis added). 
82 Legal historian J .H. Baker obviously implied Harrison when he noted that by 1714 the mitior sensus 
doctrine as a judicial approach to libel litigation was brought to an end because "people should not be 
discouraged that put their trust in the law, for if men could not have a remedy at law for such slanders 
they would [have] consequences of private revenge. Words are therefore to be taken in their most 
natural and obvious sense." BAKER, supra note 23, at 370. 
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defendant- or judge-oriented. Consequently, it did not protect the plaintiff 
against injury to his good name.83 
Second, the doctrine was created principally for the effective administration 
of defamation cases which were inundating the English common law courts in 
the late sixteenth century. In other words, it was a judicially devised expedient 
for handling a docket of rapidly increasing defamation cases during that pe-
riod.84 
Third, the mitior sensus doctrine was expanded far beyond the scope of any 
judicially sound rule which could be relied upon in defamation litigation. The 
rule was almost always successfully applied even to words obviously actionable 
per se. 85 Thus, the rule was virtually omnipotent as a weapon against defamation 
actions and produced such unintended side effects as putting libel jurisprudence 
itself into doubt. 86 
Fourth, the judges often focused on the act of the plaintiff described in the 
allegedly defamatory statement, instead of on the damage to the plaintiff arising 
from the defamatory statement.87 Consequently, courts often found it immate-
rial whether or not the statement in question was defamatory. Rather, courts 
focused on whether the plaintiff's act was a felony, even though the allegedly 
defamatory statement should have been the focus of the action. In short, courts 
which employed the mitior sensus doctrine were not concerned about who was 
verbally hit but what was said about the person in the statement at issue. 
Finally, the British courts distinguished the crimes under the jurisdiction of 
common law from those of the church courts. The mitior sensus doctrine was 
applied by English courts in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in a way 
that classified certain kinds of words as actionable per se in common law courts. 
In addition, the doctrine was also recognized as falling within the jurisdiction 
of the ecclesiastical courts which were extremely lenient in meting out penalties 
for defamation.88 
All these problems, of course, may have had a subversive effect on the mitior 
sensus doctrine. To resolve these problems and to handle the defamation cases 
83 For a discussion of the adoption by the English courts in the sixteenth century of the mitior sensus 
doctrine as a libel rule. see supra text accompanying text notes 23. 24. 
84 See generally id. and supra text accompanying note 43. 
85 For a discussion of the judicially acrobatic application of the mitior sensus doctrine to defamation 
cases. see supra text accompanying notes 68-71. 
86 For an analysis by one English court of the harmful effect of the mitior sensus doctrine on English 
libel law in the eighteenth century. see Harrison v. Thornborough. 10 Mod. Rep. 196.88 Eng. Rep. 
691 (1714). For a discussion of Harrison from the perspective of the demise of the mitior sensus doctrine, 
see supra text accompanying notes 78-81. 
87 For a discussion of the judicial application of the mitior sensus doctrine in terms of whether the 
act of the plaintiff involved was felonious or not. see supra text accompanying notes 35-37. 52-54. 
61-67. 
88 For a discussion of the application of the mitior sensus doctrine in the cases which obviously involved 
ecclesiastical sins not actionable in the common law courts. see supra text accompanying notes 44-46. 
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in a more judicially rational way, the court in Harrison stemmed the rampant 
use of the doctrine in the English courts, making it clear that words should be 
taken in their natural and obvious sense.S9 
II. THE U.S. INNOCENT CONSTRUCTION RULE 
Unlike in England, courts in the United States have not utilized the mitior 
sensus doctrine as a common law libel rule. In an 1882 case, Clifford v. Cochrane,90 
the Illinois Appellate Court rejected mitior sensus as a libel defense as it was 
understood and utilized by the English courts in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. The Illinois court observed: "In actions for slander and libel, the rule 
no longer is, that words are to be understood in mitior sensus, but they are to be 
taken according to their plain and natural import."91 
The innocent construction rule, the modified U.S. version of the English 
mitior sensus doctrine, was first utilized in Young v. Richardson, an 1879 Illinois 
appellate court case.92 The Young court held that words alleged to be libelous 
should be innocently construed if it is "fairly" possible. The invocation of the 
rule may have been a judicial device used by courts to mitigate the assumption 
of strict liability on the part of libel defendants for allegedly libelous per se 
words. One legal scholar, for example, noted: 
The attempted insinuation of an innocent construction rule in the 
Young libel case may have been due to the appellate court's concern 
for libel defendants at a time in Illinois law when all libel was 
actionable per se, unlike the law of slander, and, therefore, special 
damages never had to be proved once the language was found 
defamatory to the jury. 93 
In Fulrath v. Wolfe,9' the Illinois Appellate Court took judicial note of the 
innocent construction rule. In that case, the court held that the allegedly def-
amatory meaning could not be read into the letter in question so as to make 
the letter libelous when in fact it was nonlibelous.95 In its opinion, the court 
89 Harrison, 10 Mod. Rep. at 198,88 Eng. Rep. at 691-92. 
90 Clifford v. Cochrane, 10 Ill. App. 570 (1882). 
91 !d. at 575. See also Kamp v. U.S., 176 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Riley v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 
172 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1949). 
92 Young v. Richardson, 4 Ill. App. 364 (1879). 
93 Polelle, supra note 9, at 192. See also Illinois Doctrine, supra note 10, at 531 (termed the scope of 
the innocent construction rule "considerably" broader than that of libel per se because the libel rule 
gives the Illinois courts considerably more control over libel actions than libel per se in that the latter 
applies only where the ambiguity arises from the circumstances that the statement at issue is innocent 
on its face but libelous in light of other facts while the former rule applies to all ambiguous language). 
94 Fulrath v. Wolfe, 250 Ill. App. 130 (1928). 
95 In the letter complained of as defamatory, the defendant stated that as a result of an investigation 
he was discontinuing his business relationship with tile plaintiff whom he characterized as a "gypper." 
!d. at 133. 
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stated: "The words of an alleged libel where susceptible of it, will receive an 
innocent construction by interpretation."96 The Fulrath case is distinguished 
from Young in that the word fairly as used in the latter was omitted from the 
former, though it cited the 1879 libel case. 
Even though not so sweeping as the Young and Fulrath decisions, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court's 1913 approach toward words innocent but capable of defa-
matory meaning closely parallels the judicial rationale of innocent construction. 
In that case, Callfas v. World Publishing Co. ,97 the Nebraska high court stated that 
unless special damages are proved, no cause of action exists for allegedly def-
amatory expression susceptible to an innocent interpretation.9s 
In 1940, the Montana Supreme Court in Keller v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ,99 though 
not recognizant of the Illinois innocent construction concept, strongly implied 
in a similar tone that language with two or more meanings, one of which was 
innocent, could not be held defamatory. The Keller court held that the language 
used must be "susceptible of but one meaning and that an opprobrious one" to 
be found defamatory.loo 
Almost one hundred defamation cases lOI were decided by either state or 
federal courts in Alabama,102 California,103 Illinois,104 Indiana,105 Missouri,106 
Montana, 107 Nebraska,loB New Mexico,109 North Carolina,"° Ohio,11I and 
96/d. at 135. 
97 Callfas v. World Publishing Co., 139 N.W. 830 (Neb. 1913). 
98/d. at 833. 
99 Keller v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 108 P.2d 605 (Mont. 1940). 
100 [d. at 608. 
101 For a list of cases in which the innocent construction rule and its variations were used as a libel 
defense up to October 1982, K. Youm, The Innocent Construction Rule as a Libel Defense: Its 
Strengths, Weaknesses, and Uncertain Future 203-09 (M.A. Thesis, Southern Illinois University, 
1982). 
102 See Bowling v. Pow, 293 Ala. 178,301 So. 2d 55 (1974); Marion v. Davis. 217 Ala. 16, 114 So. 
357 (1927). 
103 For a discussion of the innocent construction rule as applied by California courts, see infra text 
accompanying notes 133-46. 
104 For a list of cases in which the innocent construction rule was used by Illinois courts between 
November 1982 and February 1986, see infra note 220 and for a list of cases involving the Illinois 
innocent construction rule before November 1982, see Youm, supra note 100. For a discussion of the 
five areas in which Illinois courts have recognized the innocent construction rule as a libel defense. 
see infra text accompanying notes 91-95, 112-30, 147-64, 174-84, 189-202.204-52. 
105 See Rose v. Indianapolis Newspapers, 213 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1954) (applying the Indiana law). 
106 See Walker v. Kansas City Star Co., 406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966). 
107 See Wainman v. Bowler, 576 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1978); Steffes v. Crawford, 143 Mont. 43, 386 P.2d 
842 (1963). For a discussion of Keller v. Safeway Stores, a 1940 Montana case involving the concept 
of innocent construction, see supra text accompanying notes 98-99. 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 96-97. 
109 See Reed v. Melnick, 471 P.2d 178 (N.M. 1970); Monnin v. Wood, 525 P.2d 387 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1974). 
110 See Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938). 
III See Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453 N.E. 2d 666 (1983); Becker v. Toulmin, 
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Oklahomal12 since the Illinois Appellate Court in Young v. Richardson adopted 
the common law libel defense. 
Of the jurisdictions recognizing and utilizing the innocent construction rule 
as a libel defense, Illinois has most expansively applied the rule to defamation 
cases. 
A. Application of the Innocent Construction Rule Prior to Chapski 
In those jurisdictions adopting the innocent construction rule, when a word 
or phrase in an allegedly libelous statement or publication carries a variety of 
connotations, the courts commonly deal with the word or phrase in an innocent 
way. Of course, the application of the rule varies from state to state in terms of 
scope, role of the jury, and the requirement for proof of special damages. For 
example, Illinois courts, which have used the rule as a common law libel defense 
most extensively, have employed it in at least five areas: (1) ambiguous expres-
sion;113 (2) missing "colloquium"; 114 (3) fair comment and criticism;115 (4) reflex-
ive expression without real meaning;1l6 and the "single instance" rule cases.ll7 
By contrast, California during the 1940s made more limited use of the innocent 
construction rule, primarily utilizing it where ambiguous language was in-
volved. IIB 
In Illinois, likewise, the innocent construction rule has been utilized most 
extensively where ambiguous expression is at issue. The Illinois courts fre-
quently consulted the definition of words in authoritative dictionaries. The 
choice of dictionary meanings, however, was qualified by the Illinois Supreme 
165 Ohio St. 549, 138 N.E.2d 391 (1956); England v. Automatic Canteen Co. of America, 349 F.2d 
989 (6th Cir. 1965) (applying the Ohio law). See also supra text accompanying notes 165-66. 
112 See Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Knight, 174 Okla. 359, 50 P.2d 350 (1935). 
113 For a discussion of the innocent construction rule in cases involving ambiguous expression, see 
infra text accompanying notes 118-30, 232-42. 
114 For a discussion of the innocent construction rule involving missing colloquium, see infra text 
accompanying notes 147-64,248. 
115 For a discussion of the innocent construction rule in cases involving fair comment and criticism, 
see infra text accompanying notes 189-94. 
llfi For a discussion of the innocent construction rule in cases involving reflexive expression, see 
infra text accompanying notes 189-94. 
II? For a discussion of the application of the innocent construction in "single instance" cases, see 
infra text accompanying notes 195-203. One New York trial court defines the "single instance" rule 
thus: "[L]anguage charging a professional person with ignorance or error on a single occasion but 
which does not accuse him or her of general incompetence, ignorance or lack of skill is not defamatory, 
per se, unless special damages are pleaded." Brower v. New Republic, 7 Med. L. Rep. 1605, 1610 
(N.V. Sup. Ct. 1981). For a detailed discussion of the single instance rule as a libel defense, see K. 
Youm, "Single Instance" Rule as a Libel Defense 9 COM. & L. (1987). 
liB For a discussion of the application of the innocent construction rule in California, see infra text 
accompanying notes 131-46. 
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Court in John v. Tribune Co. There, the court held that the words at issue must 
be given their natural and obvious meaning. llg 
Under the innocent construction rule, the word "fix" was found susceptible 
to an innocent meaning by the Illinois Appellate Court in Watson v. Southwest 
Messenger Press. 120 The libel action resulted from a newspaper article about a 
traffic ticket scandal in which 130 tickets had been issued to citizens for illegally 
parking their cars in front of their homes overnight. The article said that none 
of the ticketed persons had paid fines but that the mayor had promised to void 
them. The newspaper quoted several persons as saying that they had been 
assured that "Mayor Watson will fix them." The Illinois Appellate Court, af-
firming the lower court's summary judgment for the defendant, reasoned: 
[T]he word "fix" has many dictionary meanings. It could mean the 
process of repairing, mending or putting in order, or it could mean 
an arrangement to obtain legal immunity by social influence or even 
by payment of money. It could possibly be construed as being syn-
onymous with the word "void" which is also used in the article with 
reference to the tickets. In a situation of this type, the law requires 
that we read the articles as a whole and that the words used therein 
be given their natural and obvious meaning. Where the allegedly 
libelous words are capable of an innocent construction, they must 
be read in that manner and declared nonactionable as a matter of 
law. 121 
On the other hand, a 1977 decision by the Illinois Appellate Court, Moricoli v. 
Schwartz,122 indicates that the innocent construction rule may have a limited 
application, even where allegedly defamatory words carry more than two mean-
ings and are capable of various interpretations. The plaintiff claimed in this 
slander case that a statement concerning the cancellation of his employment as 
a singer at a nightclub was defamatory. The defendant stated that the plaintiff 
was a "fag." The plaintiff contended that this caused the cancellation of his 
contract. Consulting Webster's Third International Dictionary and finding that the 
word "fag" admits of four commonly used meanings, the court reasoned that 
the word was incapable of an innocent construction, as claimed by the defendant 
and accepted by the trial court. The Moricoli court held: 
Although characterized as "slang," the aforementioned authority 
[Webster's Third International Dictionary] indicates that the sole occa-
sion upon which the word "fag" is commonly used in the United 
119 John v. Tribune Co .• 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442, 181 N.E.2d 105, 108 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 
(1962). 
120 Watson v. Southwest Messenger Press, 12 III. App. 3d 968, 299 N.E.2d 409 (1967). 
I2Ild. at 973, 299 N.E.2d at 413 (citation omitted). 
122 Moricoli v. Schwartz, 46 Ill. App. 3d 481, 361 N.E.2d 74 (1977). 
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States, in the form of a noun and to connote an adult human being, 
is with reference to a homosexual. To suggest otherwise serves only 
to further tax the gullibility of the credulous and requires this court 
to espouse a naivete unwarranted under the circumstances. 123 
The Moricoli ruling clearly stated how the words in an allegedly defamatory 
statement are to be given their natural and obvious meaning by reference to 
the various contexts in which the statement has been used. 
In other cases, ambiguity arises not from the semantic meanings of individual 
words involved but from the syntactic structure of an allegedly defamatory 
phrase or clause as used in a statement. In Bruck v. Cincotta,124 the plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant defamed him by referring to him as a "rip-off" 
speculator. The Bruck court disagreed and interpreted the word "rip-off" as 
nondefamatory. Focusing on the adjectival function of the word in the statement 
complained of, the court observed that the word was used "not as a verb or 
noun but as an adjective to qualify 'speculators,' which is defined by the dic-
tionary as 'to enter a business transaction or other venture from which the 
profits, return of investment, capital, or other goods are conjectural'."125 Simi-
larly, the innocent construction rule prevailed where the expressions such as 
"alleged racial steering" 126 and "It could have been ... crime" 127 were challenged 
as defamatory. 
The innocent construction rule was also applied in interpreting the meaning 
of the cover format of a trade magazine which was made up to look like a 
criminal-wanted poster. The March 1972 issue of the Gasoline Dealers News, 
which carried a picture of the plaintiff, was at issue in Jacobs v. Gasoline Retailers' 
Association. 128 Along with the picture were printed the words, "Wanted! from 
Robert (Bobby) Jacobs $4,435.24!" The plaintiff argued that the cover format 
conveyed the impression that he was wanted as a criminal. The Illinois Appellate 
Court, rejecting the argument, held that the cover was capable of an innocent 
construction. The court stated: 
[T]here is only a general similarity between the picture on the cover 
of the magazine and a criminal-wanted poster. The cover says 
"Wanted! from," not "wanted for." It states that the plaintiff is 
wanted for a sum of money, not for a crime. The format undoubt-
edly calls the reader's attention to the picture, but it also calls his 
attention to all the words near the picture and directs him to an 
123 Id. at 483, 361 N .E.2d at 76. 
124 Bruck v. Cincotta, 56 Ill. App. 3d 260, 371 N.E.2d 874 (1978). 
125Id. at 265, 371 N.E.2d at 879. 
126 See infra text accompanying notes 236, 238. 
127 See infra text accompanying notes 237, 239. 
128 Jacobs v. Gasoline Retailers' Association, 28 III. App. 3d 7, 328 N.E.2d 187 (1975). 
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inside page for further information. Taken as a whole the publica-
tion is more susceptible to an innocent construction than not. 129 
301 
The Illinois courts, however, have not confined application of the innocent 
construction rule to ambiguity arising from the various meanings of the words 
or from the context in which they are used. That is, when the words or phrases 
at issue are not ambiguous in terms of their import or context, they may still 
be construed to be capable of both a defamatory and nondefamatory interpre-
tation and therefore capable of being innocently interpreted. In Levinson v. 
Time, Inc.,130 for example, an article in Time magazine was alleged by the plaintiff 
to be libelous. The article quoted a police detective investigating a burglary 
incident as saying, "He [the plaintiff] was the most uncooperative victim I've 
seen." The court held the statement nonlibelous and affirmed the trial court's 
judgment for the defendant. The Levinson court ruled: "Common sense and 
understanding tell us that a great number of people may be uncooperative with 
the police for a great variety of innocent reasons" notwithstanding the plaintiff's 
contention that the reports on his "uncooperative" behavior might have sug-
gested immoral motives or actions on the part of the plaintiff. 131 Thus, the 
circumstances under which the communication in question took place were 
considered in applying the innocent construction rule in the Levinson case. 
As noted above, California was not as overreaching in utilizing its own "pos-
sible innocent meaning rule," as the innocent construction concept is usually 
referred to.132 California courts limited use of the rule, during its brief tenure, 
to primarily ambiguous language. 133 In Peabody v. Barham,J34 for example, the 
origin of the California innocent construction rule, indicates how the California 
courts from the beginning limited the common law rule to ambiguous expres-
sions alleged to be libelous. The case arose from a statement published in a 
widely circulated daily newspaper which claimed: "Eddie Peabody's divorcing 
wife, ten years his senior, is also his aunt."135 Even though the average reader 
might accept the plaintiff's claim that the words complained of charged him 
with the crime of incestuous marriage, the Peabody court disagreed, noting that 
such was not the only interpretation: the woman referred to in the publication 
might be the plaintiff's aunt because of a former marriage to his consanguineous 
129Id. at 10, 328 N.E.2d at 189. 
130 Levinson v. Time, Inc., 89 Ill. App. 3d 338, 411 N .E.2d 1118 (1980). 
131 Id. at 342, 411 N.E.2d at 1122. 
132 Note, Torts: Libel: Determination of Libel Per Se Not Precluded by a Possible Innocent Meaning, 7 
V.C.L.A. L. REV. 560 (1960); Spiegel, Defamation by Implication-In the Confidentinl Manner, 29 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 306 (J 956). 
133 Illinois Doctrine, supra note 10, at 535. 
134 Peabody v. Barham, 52 Cal. App. 2d 581, 126 P.2d 668 (1942). 
135 Id. at 583, 126 P.2d at 669. 
302 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. X, No.2 
uncle. 136 The California Appellate Court ruled in Peabody that the innocent 
construction rule prevailed as a matter of law. Such an interpretation by the 
Peabody court of the words in question might have returned life to the English 
mitior sensus doctrine, particularly in regard to the doctrine's excesses. 137 One 
law review article, for example, commented that the reasoning of the Peabody 
case was "a classic illustration of the results of carrying the innocent construction 
rule to its extreme."138 
In 1947, five years after the Peabody decision, the innocent construction rule 
was again utilized by the California Appellate Court in Babcock v. McClatchy 
Newspapers 139 in determining the meaning of the statement: "The people of this 
county have a right to ask: 1. How was it possible for you, Mr. Babcock, going 
into office dead broke, on a salary of $4,500 to buy an office building at a 
purported price of $80,000?"140 While conceding that the challenged statement 
was "open to the construction that dishonesty and corruption may be in-
ferred,"141 the California court held that the publication was also capable of 
being innocently interpreted, that is, that the plaintiff had obtained the money 
by gift, inheritance, or profitable investment. 142 In other words, the office could 
have been bought with money from any financial source of those cited. 
In strong contrast with the rather extreme application of the common law 
defense in Peabody and Babcock, the California court in Menefee v. Codman,143 
refused to apply the innocent construction rule. The libel action stemmed in 
part from the publication of an allegedly derogatory article concerning the 
plaintiff's trip to Paris. The plaintiff asserted that she was libeled by a question 
in the controversial article: "Who covered Audrey while Audrey covered the 
water front?"144 Notwithstanding the fact that the word "cover" has various 
nondefamatory meanings, the Menefee court, rejecting the defense's argument 
based on the rulings of Peabody and Babcock, stated: "It is difficult to ascribe an 
innocent meaning to this publication. The use of the verb 'cover' as meaning 
copulation is indicated by the dictionary definition generally connected with the 
breeding of animals."145 
Just seventeen years after its debut in Peabody v. Barham, California's innocent 
construction rule was abolished. In MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing CO.,146 the 
1'6 [d. at 583., 126 P.2d at 669. 
137 For a di~c~ssion of the English mitior sensus doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 24-8J. I'. Illinois Doctnne, supra note 10, at 536. 
139 Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers, 82 Cal. App. 2d 528, 186 P.2d 737 (1947). 
140 [d. at 531, 186 P.2d at 738. 
141 [d. at 533, 186 P.2d at 740. 
142 [d. at 534, 186 P.2d at 740. 
143 Menefee v. Codman, 155 Cal. App. 2d 396, 317 P.2d 1032 (1957). 
144 [d. at 400, 317 P.2d at 1034. 
145 [d. at 405, 317 P.2d at 1037. 
146 MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536,343 P.2d 36 (1959). 
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California Supreme Court, usmg a hypothetical case involving a newspaper 
story, stated: 
[T]he paper reported that "Mrs. A, who was married last month, 
gave birth to a child last night." A charge of immoral conduct is 
apparent to all from the language used, and the paper knows and 
is fully warned of the defamatory implication. Under the rule of 
the Peabody case, however, it would escape liability unless special 
damages are proved, for the language does not exclude the innocent 
possibility that Mrs. A was widowed or divorced a few months before 
her recent marriage and that the child is that of her former husband. 
Such hair-splitting analysis of language has no place in the law of 
defamation, dealing as it does with the impact of communication 
between ordinary human beings .... It protects, not the innocent 
defamer whose words are libelous only because of facts unknown 
to him, but the clever writer versed in the law of defamation who 
deliberately casts a grossly defamatory imputation in ambiguous 
language. 147 
As noted earlier, the innocent construction rule has also been applied to cases 
in which the identification of individuals involved is at issue. In connection with 
the Illinois Supreme Court's use of the rule in John v. Tribune Co., where 
colloquium was at issue, it is noteworthy that the court did little to clarify the 
question of when the common law libel defense is applicable. Indeed, it was not 
until 1982 that the Illinois Supreme Court took up the issue of the relationship 
between the rule and the colloquium issue when the Chapski court declared that 
the rule applies to cases where the identification of the defamed person is 
unclear or difficult to establish. 148 
It is not an easy task to establish the connection between the defamatory 
words or phrases and the plaintiff. Indeed, the colloquium problem cannot 
stand alone in establishing the defamatory nature of a publication. It is fre-
quently complemented by inducement and innuendo, as clearly illustrated in a 
recent media law textbook, The First Amendment and the Fourth Estate. 149 But while 
the three may work together to prove that a publication or statement defames 
147 !d. at 550, 343 P.2d at 43-44. 
148 For a discussion of Chapski, see infra text accompanying notes 204-17. 
149 T. CARTER, M. FRANKLIN & J. WRIGHT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE 66 (3d 
ed. 1985). One authority explains "inducement" and "innuendo" as follows: 
[W]hen the defamatory meaning of the communication or its applicability to the plaintiff 
depended upon extrinsic circumstances, the pleader averred their existence in a prefatory 
statement called the "inducement." ... the communication he set forth verbatim and in the 
"innuendo" explained the meaning of the words. The function of the innuendo was expla-
nation; it could only explain or apply them in the light of the other averments in the 
declaration. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 563, at comment f. 
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the plaintiff, inducement and innuendo generally cannot be used to upset the 
use of the innocent construction rule where colloquium is at issue. 150 The judicial 
approach toward innuendo and inducement taken by Illinois courts is that when 
an allegedly defamatory but ambiguous expression can be construed innocently, 
the aid of extrinsic facts through innuendo or inducement cannot transform 
the innocent meaning into a defamatory one. l5l 
The problem of proving that the defamatory words are about or concerning 
the plaintiff, however, does not always involve the identification of a person as 
specifically targeted in an allegedly defamatory publication or statement. The 
problem of colloquium may also turn upon the use of an alias which incidentally 
identifies some other innocent person. 
The Illinois Supreme Court in John v. Tribune CO.152 provided the innocent 
construction rule with what one legal scholar called a "cornerstone precedent"153 
for utilizing the common law rule to resolve the issue of the missing colloquium. 
The John case stemmed from the two news articles published in the Chicago 
Tribune, which reported a police raid on a brothel in Chicago. The news articles 
identified the arrested proprietor of the apartment at issue as Dorothy Clark, 
also known as "Dolores Reising, 57, alias Eve Spiro and Eve John."154 By in-
credible coincidence, the plaintiff, whose maiden name had been Eve Spiro, 
and whose name at the time of the police raid was Eve John, was living in the 
basement of the apartment building in which the allegedly immoral practices 
were taking place. The plaintiff, a practicing psychologist, was not the proprietor 
of a house of prostitution as charged in the newspaper stories. 
The Illinois Supreme Court, taking analytical note of the linguistic use of the 
alias, observed: 
A name or names reported as the alias, also-known, are the names 
that have been assumed by the subjects identified by the name 
preceding the alias . .. the alias names do not change the subject of 
the publication ... but simply disclose the subject's false name or 
names. The alias names therefor, [sic] necessarily cannot be read as 
identifying the of and concerning or target name of the publica-
tion. 155 
And then, turning to the libel issue in the case, the John court ruled: 
150 See, e.g., Springer v. Harwig, 94 Ill. App. 3d 281, 418 N.E.2d 870 (1981); Van Tuil v. Carroll, 3 
111. App. 3d 869, 279 N.E.2d 361 (1972); Zeinfeld v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 41 Ill. 2d 345, 243 
N.E.2d 217 (1968). 
151 See generally cases cited at supra note 149. 
152John, 24 Ill. 2d 437,181 N.E.2d 105 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962). 
'" Polelle, supra note 9, at 200. 
15<John, 24 Ill. 2d at 439-40,181 N.E.2d at 106. 
155 [d. at 442, 181 N.E.2d at 108. 
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[T]he language in defendant's articles is not libelous of plaintiff 
when the innocent construction rule is consulted. The rule holds 
that the article is to be read as a whole and the words given their 
natural and obvious meaning, and requires that words allegedly 
libelous but capable of being read innocently must be so read and_ 
declared nonactionable as a matter of law. Since both of the publi-
cations here are capable of being construed as referring only to 
Dorothy Clark-Dolores Reising as the keeper of the disorderly 
house, they are innocent publications as to the plaintiff. 156 
305 
The problem of colloquium in the innocent construction rule cases also arises 
when "they," "some," or "any" are used in referring to individuals. Belmonte v. 
Rubinl57 is a case in point in that it involved ambiguous or unspecific pronouns 
or nouns providing ground for the application of the rule because of the unclear 
identification of the defamed person. The libel action in Belmonte resulted from 
a newspaper story concerning an eviction suit. In the story, the defendant was 
quoted as saying: "[T]hey're trying to steal the girls' home."158 The plaintiff 
charged that the defendant's statement referred to him and defamed his char-
acter. Noting that the suit involved application of the innocent construction 
rule, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the "they're" as used in the news 
story was ambiguous and therefore susceptible of being read to include individ-
uals other than the plaintiff under the common law rule. 159 
The Illinois Appellate Court recently utilized the same reasoning in regard 
to the question of identification. In Bravo Realty v. CBS,160 the court held that 
the phrase "some" realtors used in the telecast of the defendant was referring 
to parties other than the plaintiff. The court further observed that such terms, 
i.e., "some" in the instant case, are ambiguous enough to be innocently con-
strued. Both Belmonte and Bravo Realty, it should be noted, concerned statements 
or publications in which the plaintiff was not specifically named. 
Because of the uncertainty of identification which sometimes arises in libel 
actions brought by individuals, group libel actions are expected to cause even 
more difficulty in establishing colloquium in the future. In Crosby v. Time, Inc.,161 
the innocent construction rule was utilized by the defendant in a diversity case 
involving group libel. The action resulted from an article published in Time 
magazine on the activities of top Western officials of the International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters. The article stated that Teamster officials were conspiring 
with Seattle gamblers to control Portland's law enforcement agencies and to 
156 U at 442-43, 181 N.E.2d at 108. 
157 Belmonte v_ Rubin, 68 Ill. App. 3d 700, 386 N .E.2d 904 (1979). 
ISS/d. at 701, 386 N.E.2d at 905_ 
159/d. at 70 I, 386 N _E.2d at 905. 
160 Bravo Realty v. CBS, 84 Ill. App. 3d 862, 406 N.E.2d 61 (1980). 
161 Crosby v. Time, Inc., 254 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1958) (applying the Illinois law). 
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organize all the city's rackets, from pinball machines to prostitution. 162 The 
plaintiff, an official of the Teamster's Union, maintained that the article referred 
to or included him in the crime organization at issue. 163 The federal court 
disagreed, stating that such an assertion that included the plaintiff among the 
top officials of the Teamsters involved was "little more than a figment of the 
imagination."164 Affirming the lower court's judgment for the defendant, the 
Crosby court held: 
[A] reading of the article furnishes no reasonable basis for the 
thought that plaintiff, referred to as the Oregon Teamsters' repre-
sentative, was one of the top Western officials of the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters who were asserted to be conspiring with 
Seattle gamblers. Even though it be assumed, however, that he was 
one of such top officials, he could not prevail, under Illinois law, in 
the absence of a showing that all of such officials were accused of 
wronging. 165 
The innocent construction rule has also been utilized as a defense in libel 
actions involving fictitious names. In Smith v. Huntington Publishing CO.,166 for 
example, a federal district court applied the Ohio innocent construction rule in 
an action arising from an allegedly libelous newspaper article. The article con-
cerned drug addiction in the area in which the newspaper was circulated. The 
reporter, using fictitious names, inadvertently used the plaintiff's name in de-
scribing the experiences of a son's drug abuse and the efforts of his mother to 
care for her child. The article stated in bold print that the names were fictitious, 
but that the story was true. The plaintiff asserted that the article was libelous 
and that the defendant intended to injure his reputation. The court, rejecting 
the plaintiff's charge, held: 
[N]o reasonable person could have reasonably believed that the 
article pointed to the plaintiff in the light of a clear statement by 
the author in boldface print that the names were fictitious. We base 
this holding on (1) the law, as is stated in the related area of fictional 
publications and the use of fictitious names, and (2) the innocent 
construction rule approved by the sixth circuit in the case of England 
v. Automatic Canteen Co. of America. 167 
162 !d. at 928. 
163 !d. at 929. 
164 !d. at 929. 
165 !d. at 930 (citing Latimer v. Chicago Daily News, Inc., 330 Ill. App. 295, 71 N.E.2d 553 (1947)). 
166 Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (applying the Ohio 
law). 
1671d. at 1274 (citation omitted). 
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The common law defense of fair comment and cntIosm traditionally pro-
tected honest criticism and opinions about matters of general public interest so 
far as they were reasonable and factually based.[68 In New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,[69 a landmark Supreme Court decision, the rationale for the common 
law privilege of fair comment and criticism was recognized with approval as a 
matter of constitutional law for defamation actions involving public officials. [70 
Ten years later the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.[7[ reaffirmed 
that expression of opinion or belief is protected under the First Amendment. 
In dicta accompanying the decision, the Court stated: "Under the First Amend-
ment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may 
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries 
but on the competition of other ideas."[72 
The application of the common law defense of fair comment and criticism 
has, to a certain degree, been diminished by the constitutional protection of 
opinion. This is clearly indicated by the treatment given to fair comment and 
criticism by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. [73 Nonetheless, Robert Sack has 
cautioned against the hasty conclusion that the common law fair comment 
privilege has now lost its usefulness as a rule in defamation cases. The media 
law attorney wrote: 
It would be dangerous to assert conclusively that all opinion is ... 
protected by the First Amendment until the Supreme Court has 
had an opportunity to rule on the validity of the syllogism which it 
suggested in Gertz. In any event, it is to be expected that courts will 
frequently employ the common law doctrine to dispose of cases 
because they are familiar with it. Even if the constitutional protection 
is broader than, and entirely encompasses, the common law privi-
lege, there is no reason why a state court cannot dismiss a lawsuit 
on the common law ground without ever reaching the constitutional 
question. [74 
In this regard, the application of the innocent construction rule to assertions of 
comment and criticism is a case in point. 
168 See Note, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a Bright-line Rule, 
72 CEO. L.J. 1817, 1819 (1984). 
169 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963). 
170 [d. at 279-80. 
171 Certz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
I72 [d. at 339-40. 
173 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides that "[Aj statement of opinion which does not 
imply a defamatory statement of fact is no longer actionable. and no privilege is needed." RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 1, § 611, quoted in Yerkie v. Post-Newsweek, 4 MED. L. REP. 2566, 2568 (D. Md. 1979). 
I74 R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 192-93 (1980) [hereinafter SAcKj. 
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In Korbar v. Hite,175 the innocent construction rule was applied to criticism of 
a credit union policy. The litigation resulted from an article published by the 
defendant in a union newspaper which commented on the insensitivity of the 
plaintiff, the credit union president, in regard to problems facing members of 
the union. I76 The court held the language of the newspaper story to be nonli-
belous under the concept of innocent construction because it might be construed 
as criticism of the credit union policy rather than impugnment of the plaintiff's 
business or professional reputation.!'7 
The innocent construction rule was also employed as the basis for the denial 
of a slander action in Bougadis v. Langefeld. I78 The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant had made a defamatory statement about the plaintiff's collection of 
money. The gist of the statement at issue was that the plaintiff's comments 
"sounded to him like extortion."179 The Illinois court ruled that the defendant's 
statement was made to describe the substance of the plaintiff's conversation, 
not to accuse the plaintiff of committing a crime or of being unfit for his 
professional duties. I80 In particular, the opinion focused on the term "like ex-
tortion," which the court found susceptible of an innocent construction. 181 
In Garber-Pierre Food Products v. Crooks,I82 the Illinois Appellate Court, ex-
plaining the applicability of the innocent construction rule to fair comments 
and criticism, observed that: "To determine whether comments are actionable 
per se, Illinois courts apply the innocent construction rule .... "183 In Garber-
Pierre, the trial court had granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, who 
contended in the complaint that the defendant's letter accused him of commit-
ting crimes of "blackmail" and "extortion" under federal laW. I84 The Illinois 
Appellate Court reversed, reasoning that the words at issue were capable of 
being innocently construed in the context of the letter. The court noted that 
the words reflected the defendant's opinion that the plaintiff's negotiation 
concerning payment for goods was unreasonable. 185 The court based its decision 
on the interpretation of the words "blackmail" and "extortion" on a U.S. Su-
preme Court libel decision decision, Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association, 
Inc. v. Bresler.I86 In Greenbelt, the Supreme Court reviewed a libel verdict for a 
175 Korbar v. Hite, 43 Ill. App. 3d 636, 357 N.E.2d 135 (1976). 
176 [d. at 638,357 N.E.2d at 136-37. 
177 [d. at 640, 357 N .E.2d at 138. 
178 Bougadis v. Langefeld, 69 Ill. App. 3d 1010,387 N.E.2d 965 (1979). 
179 [d. at 1012,387 N.E.2d at 967. 
180/d. at 10 14, 398 N .E.2d at 968. 
181 [d. at 10 14, 387 N .E.2d at 968. 
182 Garber-Pierre Food Products v. Crooks, 78 Ill. App. 3d 356, 397 N.E.2d 211 (1979). 
183 [d. at 359,397 N.E.2d at 213 
184 [d. at 358, 397 N.E.2d at 213. 
185 [d. at 360,397 N.E.2d at 214. 
186 Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). 
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prominent local real estate developer. The position he had taken in negotiations 
with the city council to obtain zoning variances had been characterized by 
participants in public meetings as "blackmail." The defendant newspaper re-
ported the allegation in two separate articles. The developer complained that 
in using the term "blackmail," the newspaper had charged him with a crime 
and that since the newspaper knew he had not committed such a crime, it 
should be held liable for the knowing publication of falsehood. 187 The Supreme 
Court concluded that as a matter of constitutional law, the word "blackmail" in 
these circumstances was not libelous. In so holding, the court stated: 
It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached the word 
"blackmail" in either article would not have understood exactly what 
was meant: it was Bresler's public and wholly legal negotiation pro-
posals that were being criticized. No reader could have thought that 
either the speakers at the meeting or the newspaper articles re-
porting their words were charging Bresler with the commission of 
a criminal offense. On the contrary, even the most careless reader 
must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical 
hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler's 
negotiating position extremely unreasonable. 188 
Usually, the language used in epithets, insults, name-calling, or hyperbole is 
no more than either an idle comment or the venting of the speaker's or writer's 
emotions and therefore is not considered injurious to the good name of the 
insulted person. As one commentator noted, from the perspective of judicial 
efficiency, courts cannot solve all the issues involving nonactionable comments 
which arise in libel litigation. 189 
In light of the nature of vituperative or opprobrious expression, the Illinois 
courts apply the innocent construction rule when considering such statements 
on the ground that the effect of such expression has more to do with emotional 
feelings than with the actual meaning of the words. In Sloan v. Hatton,190 an 
Illinois court held nonactionable as a matter of law the defendant's letter criti-
cizing the plaintiff's business. 191 The court characterized the defendant's words 
as a "verbal jab" prompted by the plaintiff's action toward him. In addition, 
the court noted that although the statement might allude to the fitness of the 
187 [d. at 7-8. 
188 [d. at 14. 
189 SACK. supra note 173. at 58. See also Cohen. A Study in Epithetical jurisprudence. 71 CASE & COM. 
14 (1966). 
190 Sloan v. Hatton. 66 Ill. App. 3d 41.383 N.E.2d 259 (1978). 
191 In a letter to the Illinois Attorney General. the defendant charged the plaintiff with poor 
management of his mobile home business. [d. at 42. 383 N .E.2d at 260. 
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plaintiff's business ability, the "unguarded statement" was made in the midst of 
a business or commercial dispute and could not be libel per se in all cases. 192 
Similarly, the Illinois Appellate Court in Angelo v. Brenner,193 focused on the 
context of the precipitating circumstances involved. The court ruled for the 
defendant who said that the plaintiff, a police officer, was "unfit to be a police-
man."194 Terming the statement "an angry comment" by the husband of a 
woman who had violated a traffic law, the court held: 
[T]he statement was made before only three other police officers 
who were assumedly aware of the reason for defendant's presence 
at the police station and assumedly accustomed to the not uncom-
mon response of a motorist or other interested party upon receiving 
a traffic citation. In light of all these circumstances ... an innocent 
construction should be placed on defendant's statement. 195 
To err is human; no one is infallible. Such maxims appear to be the rationale 
for the "single instance" rule in libellitigation. 196 Sack explained the rule in a 
similar way: "[E]veryone makes a mistake now and then. The wrongful assertion 
that a person erred in a single instance therefore does not lower him in the 
estimation of others."197 The single instance rule has been recognized by New 
York and several other states as a libel defense. 198 In Illinois, however, the 
innocent construction rule has been employed where the single instance rule 
may have been appropriate. In Britton v. Winfield Public Library,199 an Illinois 
court noted that the alleged defamatory words concerned "one incident" and 
not a generalized character attack on the plaintifPOO The Illinois court employed 
the innocent construction rule, in holding that the article at issue was nonde-
famatory. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, also applied the innocent con-
struction rule rather than the single instance rule in Fleck Bros. Co. v. Sullivan. 201 
The alleged libel was in a letter stating that the defendant collection agency 
192 [d. at 44, 383 N.E.2d at 262. 
193 Angelo v. Brenner, 84 Ill. App. 3d 594, 406 N.E.2d 38 (1980). 
194 !d. at 596, 406 N .E.2d at 40. 
195 1<1, at 599, 406 N.E.2d at 42. 
196 F"r the judicial definition of the single instance rule, see supra note 116. 
197 SACK, supra note 173, at 70. 
198 See Brower v. New Republic, 7 MED. L. REP. 1605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Craig v. Moore, 4 MED. 
L. REP. 1402 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1978); Cinquanta v. Burdett, 154 Colo. 37 (1963); Dooling v. Budget Pub. 
Co., 144 Mass. 258 (1887). 
199 Britton v. Winfield Public Library, 101 Ill. App. 3d 546, 428 N.E.2d 650 (1981) 
200 The publication challenged to be libelous in the Britton case was a letter written by the defendant 
and published in newspapers. In the letter, the defendant stated that the plaintiff, then village 
administrator, used "dirty tricks" as part of his "cheap and dishonest government." [d. at 547, 428 
N.E.2d at 651. 
201 Fleck Bros. Co. v. Sullivan, 385 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1967) (applying the Illinois law). 
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collected a certain amount of money from the plaintiff corporation for a service 
fee. The Seventh Circuit noted that the statement merely indicated "a single 
instance in which the plaintiff failed to pay an obligation in the ordinary course 
of business." Furthermore, the court observed that a single such instance could 
result from mistake or a good-faith dispute over liability.202 The court held that 
under the Illinois innocent construction rule the publication was not actionable 
"without proof of special damage.''203 In connection with the Seventh Circuit's 
decision, it is noteworthy that in applying the innocent construction rule to the 
case, the federal court modified it by requiring proof of special damage. Insofar 
as the Illinois courts are concerned, the rule is not conditioned or qualified by 
proof of special damage. It is not clear whether the Fleck Bros. Co. court was 
attempting to alter the Illinois rule. It can be inferred from the court's reason-
ing, however, that utilization of the innocent construction rule was based upon 
the concept of the New York single instance rule as defined in November v. Time, 
Inc. 204 
B. Application of the "Modified" Rule After Chapski 
In 1982 the Illinois Supreme Court modified that state's innocent construction 
rule in Chapski v. Copley Press. 205 The Chapski case stemmed from a series of 
articles published by the defendant's newspaper. The newspaper articles con-
cerned juvenile and divorce proceedings in which the plaintiff was involved as 
an attorney. Chapski contended that the stories damaged his reputation as a 
lawyer. The newspaper, however, argued that it carried the articles only for the 
purpose of questioning a court procedure as a whole, not the involvement of 
the plaintiff. Therefore, the defendant argued, the newspaper was not libelous 
as to the plaintiff, as asserted, because of a failure to establish colloquium. The 
case was decided for the defendant by the Illinois Appellate Court, Second 
District, when it affirmed the trial court's judgment.206 The Illinois Appellate 
Court held that the defendant's articles were susceptible of an innocent con-
struction in that the publication at issue criticized the judicial system's handling 
of the proceedings involving the plaintiff.207 
202Id. at 224. 
20' Id. at 224. 
204 November v. Time, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 175,244 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1963). The New York Court of 
Appeals in November stated: ""[T]he rule ... holds that language charging a professional man with 
ignorance or mistake on a single occasion only and not accusing him of general ignorance or lack of 
skill cannot be considered defamatory on its face and so is not actionable unless special damages are 
pleaded." Id., 13 N.Y.3d at 178,244 N.Y.S.2d at 311. 
205 Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982). 
206 Chapski v. Copley Press, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1012,427 N.E.2d 638 (1981), rev'd, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 442 
N.E.2d 195 (1982). 
207 !d. at 1017,427 N.E.2d at 642. 
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The Appellate Court's decision in Chapski was appealed to the Illinois Su-
preme Court. In a unanimous opinion, the Illinois high court noted that a 
modification in the common law rule would better protect the individual's good 
name in a libel suit and at the same time encourage the First Amendment 
principle of the "robust discussion of daily affairs."208 The court held that: 
[A] written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the 
words and the implications therefrom given their natural and ob-
vious meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be 
innocently interpreted or reasonably be interpreted as referring to 
someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be actionable per se. This 
preliminary determination is properly a question of law to be re-
solved by the court in the first instance; whether the publication was 
in fact understood to be defamatory or to refer to the plaintiff is a 
question for the jury should the initial determination be resolved in 
favor of the piaintifP09 
The lllinois Supreme Court in Chapski carefully examined the innocent con-
struction rule as a defense in libel litigation, focusing upon both its legal efficacy 
and its historical development. It was the first time that the Illinois court had 
analyzed the status of the rule in an in-depth manner since its recognition in 
1962 as a common law libel defense in john v. Tribune CO.210 The Chapski court 
first traced the origin of the innocent construction rule in Illinois to john, and 
termed the court's 1962 statement concerning the rule as "obiter dictum."211 
The court then noted the inconsistent application of the rule in defamation 
cases, citing eleven cases decided by both Illinois appellate courts and federal 
courts sitting in Illinois as examples.2I2 
Second, the Chapski Court noted four appellate court cases in which the rule's 
judicial appropriateness as "a fair statement of the law"213 was strongly ques-
208 Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 351, 442 N.E.2d at 198. 
209 !d. at 352,442 N.E.2d at 199 (emphasis added). 
210 John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437,181 N.E.2d 105 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962). For 
a discussion of John, see supra text accompanying notes 151-55. 
211 Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 347, 442 N.E.2d at 196, citing Valentine v. North American Co., 60 Ill. 2d 
168, 438 N.E.2d 265 (1974). In Valentine, Justice Ward, dissenting and joined by two justices, stated: 
"I consider the 'innocent construction rule' from John v. Tribune Co .... (which I read as obiter dictum) 
has no place here." Valentine, 60 Ill. 2d at 172,328 N.E.2d at 268. One practicing attorney noted the 
Chapski court's obiter dictum comment on the John's adoption of the innocent construction rule as "one 
of the severest of judicial ad hominem." Kohn, Chapski and the Loss of Innocence, 65 CHI. B. REC. 212, 
214 (1984). 
212 Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 348, 442 N.E.2d at 197. 
2l'ld. at 348, 442 N.E.2d at 197. See, e.g., Levinson v. Time, Inc., 89 Ill. App. 3d 338, 411 N.E.2d 
1118 (1980) (the rule should apply as a question of fact, not as a matter of law, and be limited to 
where the identification issue is involved); Kakuris v. Klein, 88 Ill. App. 3d 597, 410 N.E.2d 984 (1980) 
(the Illinois courts have recently tended to erode the rule and so the rule should not apply to the 
case); Vee See Construction Co. v. Jensen & Halstead, Ltd., 79 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 399 N.E.2d 278 
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tioned. Third, the court dealt with the question of how and when the Illinois 
courts have applied the innocent construction rule. The court noted that: (a) 
the rule has been applied in slander as well as in libel cases; (b) the rule has 
been utilized to determine whether the words or phrases in question are ac-
tionable per se; and (c) the rule has been employed where the missing colloquium 
issue arises. 214 
Fourth, in the course of discussing the critical treatment accorded to the 
innocent construction rule by legal scholars, the court called attention to the 
connection between the rule and the English mitior sensus doctrine. 215 Given the 
fact that the Illinois Supreme Court had never discussed the innocent construc-
tion rule as an outgrowth of the English doctrine until Chapski, it is surprising 
that it would do so twenty years after John. 216 
And finally, in justifying the innocent construction rule, the court explicitly 
accepted the desirable contribution to mitigating the harshness of the doctrine 
of strict liability in defamation law.217 More importantly, the court observed that 
the rule enhances the interests of the First Amendment because the common 
law defense encourages the uninhibited discussion of daily affairs in accordance 
with the constitutional guarantee of free speech and free press. 218 
As a result of the Chapski modification, the innocent construction rule as 
applied by the Illinois courts between 1962 and 1982 is qualified by the "rea-
sonable" requirement in interpreting an allegedly ambiguous expression of 
defamatory nature. This was primarily intended to prevent judges from strain-
ing to find any possible innocent meanings of words where the words can be 
more reasonably construed in a defamatory way. Furthermore, the Illinois 
Supreme Court in Chapski hoped to curb further judicially inconsistent and 
confusing applications of the innocent construction rule as evidenced in the 
post-John defamation rulings in Illinois. 
The Court's modification of the innocent construction rule in Chapski has 
been characterized by some critics as the beginning of the rule's eventual 
demise219 or as a step forward in Illinois libel law by striking a balance between 
(1979) (the rule should be abandoned because of its beginning as a 'Judicial error"); Makis v. Area 
Publications Corp., 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 395 N.E.2d 1195 (1979) (the rule should be abandoned 
because its original purpose of mitigating the effect of strict liability in defamation law is not so strongly 
valid a rationale for its continued application as it was when first adopted in that liability without fault 
in defamation has been ruled unconstitutional). 
214 Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 348-49, 442 N.E.2d at 197. 
215Id. at 349-50, 442 N.E.2d at 197-98. 
216 For a discussion of the conceptual relationship between the mitior sensus doctrine and the innocent 
construction rule, see supra text accompanying notes 9-13. 
217 Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 350, 442 N.E.2d at 198. 
218Id. at 350, 442 N.E.2d at 198 (citing Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71, 397 
N.E.2d 41. 44 (1979)). 
219 Reform of the Rule, supra note 10, at 286. But cf Youm & Stonecipher, "Innocent Construction" Rule 
Survives Challenge, 7 COM. & L. 43 (1985). 
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the individual's interest in vindicating his reputation and the public's right to 
freedom of expression. 220 So far as application of the rule as modified by Chapski 
is concerned, however, the demise of the common law libel defense is far from 
evident. Indeed, it apparently still retains much of its vitality as one of the most 
effective protections afforded to the Illinois press, though its application is 
considerably less freewheeling than before Chapski. Since the Chapski modifica-
tion of reasonableness in 1982, the innocent construction rule has not been as 
successful a libel defense as it was in Illinois during the 1962-1982 period. In 
twenty-three libel cases reported between late 1982 and February 1986, both 
state and federal courts in Illinois have based their decisions on the modified 
rule of innocent construction. The rule prevailed in sixteen and failed in seven 
of these twenty-three cases.221 Thus, the modified rule has been nearly 70 
percent successful as a defense in libel actions. This is noteworthy in that 
between 1962 and 1982 the pre-Chapski rule was successfully applied in 54 out 
of 62 reported libel cases, or 87 percent of the court judgments were for 
defendants. 222 The frequency with which the courts have applied the rule for 
defendants in libel litigation has declined since 1982. This is without doubt 
related to the judicial fiat announced by the Chapski court that the rule should 
be applied only as long as the innocent construction.is reasonable.223 
Costello v. Capital Cities Media, Inc. 224 is the first post-Chapski libel case in which 
the "reasonable" requirement of the innocent construction rule was applied. 
220 Modification of the Rule, supra note 10, at 234. 
221 Cases in which the modified Chapski rule prevailed: Owen v. Carr, II MED. L REp. 2232 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1985); Grisanzio v. Rockford Newspapers, II Med. L Rep. 1958 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Dauw 
v. Kennedy & Kennedy, Inc., 140 Ill. App. 2d 163, 474 N.E.2d 380 (1984); Meyer v. Allen, 127 Ill. 
App.3d 163,468 N.E.2d 198 (1984); Renard v. CBS, 126 Ill. App. 3d 563, 467 N.E.2d 1090 (1984), 
urt. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2358 (1985); Sivulich v. Howard Publications, Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 129,466 
N.E.2d 1218 (1984); Heying v. Simonaitis, 126 Ill. App. 3d 157,466 N.E.2d 1137 (1984); Matchett v. 
Chicago Bar Ass'n., 125 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 467 N.E.2d 271 (1984); Audition Div., Ltd. v. Better 
Business Bureau, 120 Ill. App. 3d 254, 458 N.E.2d 115 (1983); Antonelli v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 
115 Ill. App. 3d 432, 450 N.E.2d 876 (1983); Cartwright v. Garrison, 113 Ill. App. 3d 536, 447 N.E.2d 
446 (1983); O'Donnell v. CBS, 12 MED. L REp. 1697 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying the Illinois law); Quilici 
v. Second Amendment Foundation, 12 MED. L REP 1744 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying the Illinois law); 
Pruitt v. Chow, 742 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying the Illinois law); Paul v. Premier Elec. Const. 
Co., 581 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (applying the Illinois law); Spelson v. CBS, 581 F. Supp. 1195 
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (applying the Illinois law). Cases in which the modified Chapski rule failed: Fried v. 
Jacobson, 99 Ill. 2d 24, 457 N.E.2d 392 (1983); Resudek v. Sberna, 132 Ill. App. 3d 753, 469 N.E.2d 
679 (1984); Erickson v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 127 Ill. App. 3d 753, 469 N.E.2d 679 (1984); Am. Int'l 
Hospital v. Chicago Tribune Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 435, 458 N.E.2d 1305 (1983); Crinkley v. Dow 
Jones & Co., 119 Ill. App. 3d 147,456 N.E.2d 138 (1983); Costello v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., III 
Ill. App. 3d 1009,334 N.E.2d 13 (1982); Action Repair v. ABC, 12 MED. L REP. 1398 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(applying the Illinois law). 
222 For a list of libel cases in which Illinois courts applied the innocent construction rule from Young 
v. Richardson of 1879 to Chapski v. Copley Press of 1982, see Youm, supra note 100, at 203-09 . 
• 23 For a discussion of Chapski, see supra text accompanying notes 204-17. 
224 Costello v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., III Ill. App. 3d 1009,334 N.E.2d 14 (1982). 
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The Illinois Appellate Court interpreted the modified common law rule as 
placing the editorial in question beyond the protection of the innocent construc-
tion rule. The case involved an editorial published in the defendant's newspaper 
in which the writer called the plaintiff, the county board chairman, "a liar" and 
characterized his leadership as a "brand of lying."225 The plaintiff contended 
thauhe publication was libelous per se since it reflected adversely upon him with 
respect to his honesty and his ability as chairman of the county board. The trial 
court disagreed, ruling that defendant was not liable for its publication under 
the innocent construction rule because the editorial in question was a criticism 
of the plaintiff's conduct in a particular instance, not a general attack on his 
honesty or character. The trial court applied the rule where the single instance 
approach could have been used as a defense.226 
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed, holding that the editorial 
was actionable per se227 because it imputed that the plaintiff was unable to 
perform his duties and lacked integrity.228 To find the editorial innocent, the 
court noted, would not be consistent with the Chapski ruling because it would 
"strain to find a possible, but unnatural, innocent meaning, when a defamatory 
meaning is far more probable."229 
In a 1984 libel case, Erickson v. Aetna Life & Cas. CO.,230 the Illinois Appellate 
Court in applying the Chapski rule focused on the contextual circumstances in 
which an allegedly defamatory publication was prepared. Noting the Chapski 
statement that allegedly defamatory statements should be interpreted in con-
text,231 the court held: 
[C]onsidering the context of the statement made by defendant [con-
cerning plaintiff-chiropractor's treatment], we do not believe it can 
be given an innocent construction. Although ... the statement on 
its face was limited to comments on "the care and treatment in this 
225 [d. at 1012,445 N.E.2d at 15. 
226 For a discussion of the application of the innocent construction rule where the single instance 
rule might have been more appropriate, see supra text accompanying notes 195-203. 
227 In Illinois, words which on their face and without the aid of extrinsic evidence impute to the 
plaintiff any of the following are deemed actionable per se: (1) commission of a crime; (2) infection 
with a loathsome disease; (3) unfitness or lack of integrity in performing the duties of office or 
employment; or (4) inadequate ability of the party in his or her profession, business, or trade. Fried 
v.Jacobson, 107 III. App. 3d 780, 438 N.E.2d 495 (1982), vacated, 99 III. 2d 24, 457 N.E.2d 392 (1983); 
Pet Motels, Inc. v. Chicago Veterinary Medical Ass'n, 106 III. App. 3d 626,435 N.E.2d 1297 (1982); 
Springer v. Harwig, 94 III. App. 3d 281, 418 N.E.2d 870 (1981). 
228 Costelio, III III. App. 3d at 10 14, 445 N .E.2d at 17. 
229Id. at 1014,334 N.E.2d at 17. But cf Delis v. Sepsis, 9 III. App. 3d 217, 292 N.E.2d 138 (1972) 
(Under the pre-Cluzpski rule of innocent construction, the word "liar," "dishonorable," and "deluded" 
in reference to the plaintiff's activities as secretary of an organization were held innocent because they 
were merely "name calling"). 
230 Erickson v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 137 III. App. 3d 753,469 N.E.2d 679 (1984). 
231Id. at 759, 469 N .E.2d at 683. 
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case," ... we nonetheless believe that when one considers the context 
of the entire statement, an innocent construction cannot be found.2s2 
Although post-Chapski courts are more reluctant to apply the innocent con-
struction rule for defendants in libel cases, the rule is still used by defendants 
as a defense in suits involving ambiguity in terms of meanings, contexts, and 
colloquium. Indeed, on some occasions where the "reasonable" innocent con-
struction rule has been invoked, Illinois courts have dealt with the interpretation 
of the allegedly defamatory statements in a manner similar to the pre-Chapski 
approach. In Antonelli v. Field Enterprises, Inc.,m for example, the Illinois Ap-
pellate Court used the rule in holding nondefamatory the Chicago Sun-Times 
story which referred to the plaintiff as a "reputed mobster" and "reputed hit 
man," among other terms. Consulting the definitions of the phrase at issue as 
set forth in authoritative dictionaries,2s4 the court held that: 
The term "reputed" means "supposed, thought, or reckoned 
.... " "Supposed" in turn, is defined as "believed to be or accepted 
as such usu [sic] on slight grounds or in error: erroneously imputed 
or ascribed .... " Therefore, Field [defendant] accurately depicted 
plaintiff as one about whom the word "mobster" had been "sup-
posedly," perhaps "erroneously imputed," as the balance of the 
article reveals, thereby supporting the "innocent" construction of 
the word "mobster."2S5 
In interpreting the term "mobster," the court also took note of the plaintiff's 
record of breaking the law and observed that "mobster" as used in the news 
story was an accurate portrayal of the plaintiff on the ground that it connotes 
the kind of person who breaks or violates the law.2s6 
The reasoning of the court in applying the modified innocent construction 
rule to the Antonelli libel case is very similar to Homestead Realty Co. v. Stack2S7 
and Makis v. Area Publications Corp.2S8, two libel cases before Chapski, because 
Antonelli was largely based on ambiguity stemming from the structure of the 
allegedly defamatory statement. In Homestead, the court found nonlibelous the 
phrase "alleged racial steering" which the defendant charged the plaintiff with 
engaging in. The court, calling attention to the word "alleged" in the defendant's 
232 ld. at 740, 469 N .E.2d at 684. 
233 Antonelli v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 115 Ill. App. 3d 432, 450 N.E.2d 876 (1983). 
234 The court consulted WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976) for the word 
"reputed" and ROGET'S INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS (4th ed. 1977) and WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARy(197 I) for the term "mobster." ld. at 435,450 N.E.2d at 878-79. 
235 Antonelli, 115 Ill. App. 3d 435, 450 N .E.2d at 878 (citation omitted). 
236ld. at 435, 450 N.E.2d at 878-79. 
237 Homestead Realty Co. v. Stack, 57 Ill. App. 3d 575, 373 N.E.2d 429 (1978). 
23B Makis v. Area Publications Corp., 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 395 N.E.2d 1185 (1979). 
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statement, ruled that the statement did not say that he was engaged in racial 
steering but that he was alleged to be the violator of the real estate law.239 
Similarly, in Makis the Illinois Appellate Court applied the innocent construction 
rule to the statement: "It could have been ... plain crime" that prompted 
owners of certain businesses to take flight. Rejecting the argument of the plain-
tiff that the word "crime" implies that the plaintiff committed a crime, the court 
held that the word, qualified by the phrase "could have been," does not impute 
any specific criminal act to him.240 
In a 1984 libel case, Sivulich v. Howard Publications,/nc., 241 the plaintiff asserted 
that the defendant's newspaper defamed him in publishing that "charges" of 
aggravated battery had been filed against him. He argued that the word 
"charge" was used only for felonious crimes and, therefore, as used in the story, 
implied that he had committed a felony.242 The Sivulich court did not agree 
with the plaintiff, noting that: "The natural and ordinary meaning of the word 
'charged' is broad enough to encompass civil as well as criminal charges. In a 
generic sense, it includes any assertion against an individual, including aver-
ments in a civil complaint."243 In ruling against the plaintiff, the court made it 
clear that the modified innocent construction rule does not apply to the technical 
and legal meanings of words. Thus, the "reasonable" requirement of the Chapski 
decision does not affect the application of the rule where the ambiguous mean-
ings of words, one of which is innocent, are at issue. 
In Cartwright v. Garrison,244 a 1983 libel action, the judicial parameters of the 
modified innocent construction rule are outlined through several issues which 
involve the interpretation of the common law libel defense. The case is also 
significant in that the plaintiff challenged the court to abandon even the mod-
ified rule of innocent construction, replacing it with a so-called "reasonable 
construction" rule. 245 The Cartwright case arose from a newspaper story con-
cerning a statement made by the defendant. The story quoted the defendant 
as mentioning "misdeeds by the administration" involving the plaintiff as the 
239 Homestead, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 577, 373 N.E.2d at 431, citing Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 
(1971). 
240 Makis, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 457-58, 395 N.E.2d at 1189 (citing Homestead Realty Co. v. Stack, 57 
Ill. App. 3d 575, 373 N.E.2d 429 (1978». 
241 Sivulich v. Howard Publications, Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 129,466 N.E.2d 1218 (1984). 
242 [d. at 131-32, 466 N.E.2d at 1220. The battery charges against the plaintiff arose from his 
altercation with the grandfather of one of his students. 
24'!d. at 132,466 N.E.2d at 1220. 
244 Cartwright v. Garrison, 113 Ill. App. 3d 536, 447 N.E.2d 446 (1983). 
245 The "reasonable construction" rule is defined thus: "[W]ords are to be taken in the sense in 
which they are reasonably understood under the circumstances, and are to be presumed to have the 
meaning ordinarily attached to them by those familiar with the language used." PROSSER & KEETON 
ON TORTS, supra note I, at 781. See also F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 362 (1956). For a 
discussion of the proposal that the Illinois innocent construction rule should be replaced by the 
reasonable construction rule, see Polelle, supra note 9, at 218-19. 
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superintendent of the school board.246 The plaintiff contended that the state-
ment was defamatory of him because it falsely accused him of committing a 
crime and injured his professional reputation.247 
In ruling on the defamation issue, the Cartwright court applied the innocent 
construction rule as modified in 1982. First, the court focused on the context 
in which the allegedly defamatory statement was made, i.e., a closed meeting 
of the school board at which the defendant was asked to resign. Noting that 
the only violations of the law specifically mentioned in the news story were 
related to the board's violations of the Illinois Open Meetings Act, the court 
stated that nothing in the story implicated the plaintiff in the violations as an 
individual. 248 
Second, the Illinois Appellate Court in Cartwright turned to the colloquium 
issue involving the phrase "misdeeds by the administration." Rejecting the plain-
tiff's contention that the statement was about him, the court held: 
The word "administration" covers a broad group of people beyond 
the plaintiff and therefore can reasonably be interpreted as refer-
ring to someone other than the plaintiff .... As the only violations 
of law expressly mentioned in the article were Open Meetings Act 
violations by the board, the reference to "criminal penalties" in 
defendant's allegedly defamatory statement, when considered in 
context, can reasonably be interpreted as referring to the board and 
not the plaintiff.249 
The court pointed out that so long as the identification is unclear and unspecific 
in an allegedly defamatory expression, the modified concept of innocent con-
struction is prevalent. 
Third, the court held nondefamatory the defendant's comment on the legal 
ramifications of the state's attorney's investigation of the school board. The 
Illinois court noted that the comment at issue "may reasonably be read as 
defendant's opinion" on this subject.25o As the pre-Chapski courts used the 
innocent construction rule in fair comment and criticism cases,251 the modified 
rule continues to be utilized in post-Chapski cases, as the Cartwright ruling indi-
cates.252 
246 Cartwright, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 539, 447 N.E.2d at 447. 
247 [d. at 540, 447 N .E.2d at 448. 
248/d. at 541. 447 N.E.2d at 449. 
249/d. at 541. 447 N.E.2d at 449. 
250 [d. at 542. 447 N .E.2d at 449. 
251 For a discussion of the Illinois courts' use of the innocent construction rule where the fair 
comment and criticism privilege was involved, see supra text accompanying notes 174-84. 
252 See Quilici v. Second Amendment Foundation. 12 Med. L. Rep. 1744 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying 
the Illinois law); Owen v. Carr. 11 Med. L. Rep. 2232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
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With regard to the plaintiff's demand that Illinois should abandon the in-
nocent construction rule and instead adopt the reasonable construction rule, 
the Cartwright court held: "In light of our supreme court's recent modification 
of the innocent-construction rule in Chapski v. Copley Press . .. we decline con-
sideration of any further changes in the rule."253 
Notwithstanding the criticism that the innocent construction rule more often 
benefits sloppy journalists than innocent ones,254 the rule has proven to be an 
effective defense for defendants in defamation litigation involving a publication 
capable of various meanings, one of which is innocent. 255 First, the common law 
libel rule is broad in its application in that it focuses solely on the language of 
a publication or statement in question. Thus, the rule has provided a judicial 
sanctuary for defendants in libel actions involving ambiguous expression sus-
ceptible of an innocent construction in those jurisdictions applying the common 
law defense. 
Second, as the Illinois Appellate Court in Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc. 256 and 
the Illinois Supreme Court in Chapski257 observed, the innocent construction 
rule provides the so-called "breathing space" needed to foster vital social values 
of freedom of expression. 
Third, the application of the innocent construction rule has largely been an 
attempt to mitigate the strict application of another underlying concept of 
defamation litigation, that is, that it matters who was hit, not who was aimed at. 
This application is useful when the missing colloquium is at issue in defamation 
cases.258 The libel defense also limits the traditional presumption of liability 
without fault in allowing an early resolution of the action as a matter of law. 
Finally, although it is not the primary goal of the innocent construction rule 
to reduce or speedily administer defamation cases, it may have the effect of 
discouraging frivolous litigants from turning to the court for recovery of dam-
253 Cartwright, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 542, 447 N.E.2d at 450 (citation omitted). See also Renard v. CBS, 
126 Ill. App. 3d 563, 467 N.E.2d 1090 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2358 (1985) (the innocent 
construction rule does not violate due process and equal protection under the federal and state 
constitutions). 
254 See R. PHELPS & E. HAMILTON, LIBEL: RIGHTS, RISKS, RESPONSIBILITIES 20 (rev. ed. 1978) 
("[S]loppy reporters in Illinois are the beneficiaries of ... the innocent construction [rule]"). 
255 The impact of the pre-Chapski rule of innocent construction has been verified by a 1981 study 
of libel litigation. The empirical study, conducted by Stanford law professor Marc Franklin, indicated 
that Illinois media defendants won 93 percent of all appellate decisions. Franklin, Suing Media for 
Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 797, 828. This "startingly high" success rate of 
defense for the media in Illinois, which is higher than any other, is attributed to the innocent 
construction rule. [d. at 828-29. 
256 Dauw v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 78 Ill. App. 3d 67,71,397 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1979). 
257 Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 352, 442 N.E.2d at 199 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964». 
258 For a discussion of the innocent construction rule in cases involving missing colloquium, see supra 
text accompanying notes 151-64. 
320 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. X, No.2 
ages to reputation in that a majority of such libel actions have resulted in rulings 
for the defendant. 
In spite of these advantages, the innocent construction rule does present 
problems which courts must address. The first and foremost weakness of the 
rule, based upon historical developments, is that it has the potential of being 
abused by libel defendants as a cheap weapon against liability for defamation.259 
Even when the innocent construction rule is utilized in a missing colloquium 
context, it is subject to criticism insofar as such application may unjustly and 
unfairly protect the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff's reputation and 
good name. 
Ill. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The English mitior sensus doctrine and the American innocent construction 
rule bear particular resemblance so far as ambiguous expression capable of 
defamatory interpretation is concerned. At the same time, however, there are 
considerable differences in origin, scope of application, and rationale as defa-
mation rules. 
As the history of the mitior sensus doctrine indicates, the evolution of the 
doctrine was not in accord with the intention of the defamation laws, which was 
to discourage defamation against others by punishing those who defame. The 
primary raison d'etre of the English doctrine was to stem the proliferating 
defamation cases then inundating the English courts in the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries. 
On the other hand, even though the concept of innocent construction was 
basically borrowed from the mitior sensus doctrine, it was purported to mitigate 
the assumption of strict liability arising out of the libel per se problem. More 
importantly, in terms of the rationale of this rule, the American libel rule serves 
the constitutional interests of free speech and press by encouraging the robust 
discussion of daily affairs by providing the breathing space for the fruitful 
exercise of the First Amendment guarantees. 
The mitior sensus doctrine is also distinguished from the innocent construction 
rule in its scope of application in that the doctrine was more broadly utilized as 
a libel defense than the rule. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the judicial 
definition of the mitior sensus doctrine was different from that of the innocent 
construction rule. Under the English doctrine, the words complained of must 
be construed in a milder sense whenever possible, not in their natural sense. 
259 For an analysis of the potential abuse by libel defendants of the innocent construction, as given 
by the California Supreme Court in 1959, see supra text accompanying note 146. See also Eldredge, 
supra note 23, at 742 (the rule permits newspapers to destroy an individual's reputation without liability 
merely by phrasing a defamatory statement so that it is capable of being innocently construed). 
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By contrast, the innocent construction rule holds that the publication is to be 
understood as a whole and the words given their "natural and obvious meaning." 
The "natural and obvious meaning" approach in interpreting allegedly libelous 
words was recognized in England after the mitior sensus doctrine had already 
lost its judicial soundness as a libel rule, not as part of the mitior sensus doctrine. 
Furthermore, the "reasonable" innocent construction rule is even further re-
moved from the now defunct mitior sensus doctrine. 
Clearly, the English doctrine was an arbitrary manipulation of the defamation 
law in Great Britain for a particular period of time, without any regard of the 
primary purpose of an action for defamation, the vindication of the plaintiff's 
good name. The innocent construction rule, on the other hand, may be viewed 
as an ongoing judicial attempt to solve the difficulty of dealing with the ambig-
uous language in allegedly defamatory publications and statements while pro-
tecting the interests of individuals to their good names and at the same time 
providing maximum protection for freedom of expression. 
